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1. Introduction 
It is a relatively simple matter to specify, at least in broad terms, the conditions under which 
we can come to know that a particular artwork has various descriptive properties; that a 
painting is a certain size, a sonata in a specific key, a novel by a particular author, and so 
forth. By contrast, there is considerable disagreement as to how to properly judge the 
evaluative aesthetic properties of an artwork. In this paper I consider two influential claims 
concerning such judgements (hereafter ‘aesthetic judgements’) and argue that there is a 
hitherto underexplored tension between them. The first of these (TT) maintains that the 
surest test of the aesthetic value of an artwork is how well its reputation weathers ‘changes 
of climate, government, religion, and language’ (Hume: 1757 / 1875: 255); that is, whether it 
passes ‘the test of time’. 1 The second (NT) is the view, often referred to as ‘pessimism 
concerning aesthetic testimony’, according to which testimony cannot serve as a legitimate 
source for aesthetic judgements. That ‘a thing has pleased others could never serve as the 
basis for an aesthetical judgment’ (Kant 1790 / 2005: 94).  
Although these doctrines are typically associated with the two giants of modern 
aesthetics – Hume and Kant respectively – my intent in this paper is not exegetical. My 
primary concern is not with the doctrines as originally presented in the works of Kant and 
Hume but with evaluating what I take to be the most fruitful contemporary versions of these 
                                                          
1 This test would plausibly be even more secure if the work’s reputation was also synchronically 
cross-culturally robust. I will, however, focus on the diachronic case in this paper. 
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claims.2 In §2 I say a little more about my preferred understanding of these doctrines. The 
main upshot of this section will be a view according to which both TT and NT should be 
interpreted in broadly epistemic terms. I then argue that there is a previously underexplored 
conflict between these two theses, such that one cannot reasonably accept them both. In §3 I 
survey, and ultimately reject, some possible attempts to reconcile the two doctrines. In §4 
and §5 I argue that there are a number of excellent reasons to accept TT and, therefore, 
reasons to reject NT.  
 
2. The Two Claims 
2.1 The Test of Time 
TT finds support from a number of Hume’s most notable contemporaries, including Samuel 
Johnson (1765) ,who asserts that for ‘works of which the excellence is not absolute and 
definitive […] no other test can be applied than length of duration and continuance of 
esteem’. And interest in TT is not peculiar to the eighteenth century. Indeed, as Anthony 
Savile (1982: 1) notes: 
As long as the arts have attracted interpretation and criticism it has been common […] 
practice to appeal to the judgement of time in distinguishing accurate from inaccurate 
estimates […] and in setting the individual artist in his rightful place in the pantheon of 
the great.3  
The importance of TT has also been stressed by a number of contemporary philosophers. 
Anita Silvers (1991: 211), for example, maintains that no ‘artwork attains canonical status 
totally independently of its ability to inspire enduring aesthetic admiration’ and Jerrold 
Levinson (2002: 233) claims that since masterpieces ‘singularly stand the test of time […] it is 
thus a reasonable supposition that such works have a high artistic value’.4 
                                                          
2 For exegetical discussion see, e.g., Friday (1998) and Crowther (2010). 
3 For discussion of the history of such views see Savile (1982: 33-40). 
4 See also Levinson (2010: 225-7) and Sibley (1968: 50-51). 
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Those who endorse TT typically construe the relevant test as asking whether a 
particular aesthetic judgement survives across a range of times. For the judgement that 
Homer is a great poet – and, mutatis mutandis, that Michelangelo’s David is beautiful or that 
Mozart’s symphonies are superior to Salieri’s – to pass the test of time it must be endorsed 
not only by critics during Homer’s lifetime, or during our own, but by a range of suitable 
critics throughout different historical periods. And it is an interpretation of TT along these 
lines which I will adopt throughout this paper. In particular, I think we should construe TT 
as an epistemic claim, one according to which we can often come to know that a work possess 
a particular aesthetic property on the basis that the judgement that it possess that property 
passes the test of time. I am also construing the test here as primarily concerned with 
whether an aesthetic judgement endures across time. As such, I intend talk of a work’s 
passing the test merely as a shorthand for the claim that a particular judgement concerning 
that work – which, unless stated otherwise, I will take to be the judgement that the work is 
excellent – passes the test. This interpretation is, however, a controversial one and others 
have formulated the test so as to involve a more direct appeal to something like the survival 
of the work itself. I will have much more to say about why I believe we should accept an 
interpretation of the kind I have proposed in §3, but for now I will content myself with 
mentioning some further points of clarification with respect to my preferred understanding 
of TT.  
First, I intend TT only to serve as a source of information concerning those works 
which pass the test of time and to be silent with respect to those which fail to do so. Works 
can fail to pass TT for a number of reasons which have no bearing on their aesthetic 
character. Most obviously because, as Savile (1977: 203) suggests, they ‘are never even 
brought to the test; they are simply not available, being lost or destroyed, damaged or 
obscured’. And even those works which are brought to the test might systematically fail to 
pass it for reasons which are irrelevant to their artistic status. For example, (as I will discuss 
in §5) many works which possess great aesthetic value are systematically judged to lack 
such value owing to factors such as the sex, race, or class of the artists who created them. As 
such, I do not believe that we can draw any interesting conclusions about the aesthetic value 
(or lack of same) of a work merely from its failure to pass TT.  
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Second, it is worth noting that the test, as I have outlined it, is rather underspecified 
in a number of respects. I have not, for example, said anything about how to deal with a 
class of difficult cases highlighted by Hume himself (1757 / 1875: 232-4), where the apparent 
consensus surrounding a work results, at least in part, from its being interpreted very 
differently by different critics.5 One might wonder, then, to what extent some work, w’s, 
passing TT is compatible with the critical consensus surrounding w having resulted from its 
being interpreted in radically different ways.6 My strategy will largely be to sidestep this 
issue by focusing on cases where it seems clear that the critical consensus I am discussing 
does not result from such radically different interpretations. This does not, of course, require 
that there are no differences amongst critics in interpreting these works (it is not clear 
whether any work would pass that test), but merely that such differences are typically not 
central to their interpretation and evaluation of the works in question. Nor does it require 
that there is absolute unanimity with respect to such interpretations. As such, the existence 
of, for example, trenchant Freudian critics who insist on a psychoanalytical interpretation 
and evaluation of all of the works I discuss below would not undermine my claims. What is 
required is that there exists a wide range of suitable critics across time who have interpreted 
the works in question in substantially the same way and who have, on that basis, converged 
on particular aesthetic judgements concerning them. 
Nor is this the only important question which my account has left unanswered. I 
have not, for example, said anything about precisely what makes someone a suitable critic, 
or given any indication as to how long the critical consensus concerning a work must endure 
in order for it to pass TT. Of course, anyone intending to provide a complete account of the 
nature and value of the test of time would need to addresses these questions (and many 
more besides). However, since my intent here is nowhere near this ambitious – I wish 
merely to defend the plausibility of a particular general approach to TT rather than the 
details of any specific account – it will serve my purposes better to avoid such controversies 
altogether and to focus instead on some clear core cases of judgements which successfully 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Feagin (1982).  
6 I thank an anonymous referee from the journal for pushing me to consider this point in greater 
detail. 
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pass TT. I will, for example, only discuss cases where the consensus concerning a work has 
endured for well over a century, thus meeting a range of different proposed standards for 
the length of time required to pass time’s test.7 Similarly, I will aim to allay worries about 
which critics we take to be suitable for inclusion by focusing on well-known canonical works 
which have been discussed and evaluated by a wide range of critics in different ages, rather 
than on judgements concerning more esoteric works which may only ever have been 
discussed in rather narrow circles.  
 
2.2 Pessimism 
In order to understand NT (and, indeed, TT discussed above) we must ask what is meant by 
the notoriously promiscuous phrase ‘aesthetic judgement’. I intend ‘judgement’ here to be 
taken in the sense in which it is often used in contemporary debates in metaethics, such that 
a judgement is the mental correlate of a declarative sentence and is expressed ‘by sincere 
assertoric use of [such] a sentence’ (Sinclair 2006: 253).8 Understanding ‘judgement’ in this 
way will doubtless raise immediate concerns for some readers, and I will endeavour to 
address these in the next section. For now, though, I will proceed on the assumption that NT 
is to be interpreted as the claim that aesthetic judgements of this kind cannot be legitimately 
formed on the basis of testimony. 
A version of NT which maintains that aesthetic judgements formed on the basis of 
testimony cannot achieve the status of knowledge has been widely defended.. Philip Pettit 
(1983: 25), for example, argues that ‘[a]esthetic characterisations are essentially perceptual’ 
meaning that perception is the only route to ‘full knowledge […] of the truths which they 
express’ and Daniel Whiting (forthcoming: 17) that ‘testimony cannot deliver aesthetic 
knowledge’.9 I do not, however, mean to limit NT to serving such a narrowly epistemic role 
                                                          
7 See Savile (1982: 9-10).  
8 See also Lillehammer (2002: 1-2). 
9 See also Hopkins (2000), Andow (2014) and Hazlett (forthcoming: 1). 
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since any such restriction would exclude two interesting varieties of pessimism from 
consideration. First, the view, most notably defended by Rob Hopkins (2006, 2011), 
according to which aesthetic beliefs are constrained by certain ‘non-epistemic’ norms, norms 
which would render such beliefs illegitimate even in cases where ‘the belief the recipient is 
offered would count as knowledge’ (ibid. 147).10 Second, the view defended by those, such 
as Cain Todd (2004: 290), who maintain that advocates of NT should not ‘hold that aesthetic 
judgements are beliefs […] at all’ but, rather, that they should account for such judgements 
in an expressivist or quasi-realist manner.11 In what follows I will, for ease of exposition 
only, assume that aesthetic judgements are beliefs in a straightforward sense, and that they 
are governed exclusively by epistemic norms. As such, I will present both NT and TT as 
narrowly epistemic claims. Crucially, though, neither of these assumptions is relevant to my 
overall aim in this paper, and the conclusions I reach in later sections could equally well be 
supported (mutatis mutandis) by arguments which appeal to non-epistemic norms of belief or 
expressivist accounts of aesthetic judgement.12 
 
2.3 Where the Conflict Lies 
Given what I have said above, the reader will, I suspect, already have some idea as to why I 
take NT and TT to be in conflict. NT maintains that we cannot achieve aesthetic knowledge 
on the basis of testimony, whereas TT maintains that we can frequently come to know that a 
work possesses some aesthetic property, p, by learning that the judgement that it possesses p 
passes the test of time. Yet, an aesthetic judgement’s passing the test of time is a matter of 
that judgement’s being endorsed by a range of different critics across time. That is, of the 
                                                          
10 See also Gorodeisky (2010). 
11 See also Scruton (1976). 
12 Similarly, my account is intended (for reasons discussed in, e.g., Robson forthcoming) to be only 
superficially dependent on the assumption that aesthetic judgements are constitutively governed by 
norms rather than, say, aims or functions. 
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claim that the work possess p being suitably supported by testimony of the relevant kind 
(testimony, perhaps at second or third hand, from these critics).  
 
One might reasonably worry, though, that this account of the apparent conflict is 
problematically simplistic in some key respects.13 First, it might reasonably be pointed out 
that while TT, as I have construed it, concerns judgement (a private mental state), testimony 
requires someone to actually assert – or otherwise express – the judgement in question (a 
public social act). As such, it would, at least in principle, be possible to rely on TT without 
violating NT if one could form aesthetic judgements entirely on the basis of the unexpressed 
private judgements of the relevant critics. In practice, though, such a feat would, of course, 
be impossible (we do not have access to the private mental states of contemporary critics 
and, still less, to those of critics long since dead). As such, simplifying things by focusing 
only on the expressed judgements of the critics in question, rather than their judgements 
simpliciter, will be unproblematic.  
A deeper worry concerns the means by which such judgements are expressed. While 
critics will often express their judgement that, e.g., a particular painting is excellent by 
straightforwardly testifying as to its excellence, this is not the only means by which such a 
judgement can be conveyed. A critic may, for example, signal this judgement by making 
approving sounds or facial expressions in the presence of the painting or by paying large 
sums of money to acquire it. Further, a critic will often go beyond merely expressing her 
judgement with respect to a particular work, she will also typically be ‘committed to backing 
up her evaluations with reasons’ (Carroll 2009: 7-8). Yet, despite such complications, I take it 
that simplifying things as I have done above is unproblematic for two reasons. First, it is (as 
a matter of descriptive fact) extremely rare for us to have records of these other expressions 
of approval which spread as widely or endure as long as those of a critic’s testimony. As 
such, TT will still rely primarily – though by no means exclusively – on testimony rather 
than these other indicators of critical judgement. Similarly, while many critics – from other 
                                                          
13 I thank Daniel Whiting and an anonymous referee from the journal for encouraging me to address 
these concerns in detail. 
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times as well as our own – have provided some indication as to their reasons for believing, 
say, that The Marriage of Figaro is excellent, it is commonplace for someone who is aware of 
this critical consensus to be entirely ignorant as to the reasons particular critics offer in 
support of it. 
Second, those who are critical of our reliance on testimony in particular domains are 
typically equally reluctant to permit judgements based on other kinds of deference to the 
views of others.14 Indeed, pessimists in aesthetics tend to be even more restrictive concerning 
what they take to be the proper sources of aesthetic judgement. While the letter of their 
pessimism only commits them to excluding testimony, most pessimists reject not only 
deference more generally but also any source of judgement (such as inferences from so 
called ‘principles of taste’, enumerative induction etc.) other than first-hand acquaintance 
with the object judged.15 Such sweeping prohibitions are typically justified by endorsing 
some broad principle of aesthetic judgement such as Richard Wollheim’s Acquaintance 
Principle, according to which ‘judgments of aesthetic value [...] must be based on first-hand 
experience of their objects’ (1980: 233). And even pessimists such as Hopkins who are keen 
to explicitly differentiate claims about the legitimacy of testimony from those concerning the 
legitimacy of these other sources (2000: 212-3, 2006: 86-90) still end up appealing to wider 
principles (Hopkins 2011: 149-53) which rule out all such sources as legitimate for aesthetic 
judgment.16  
Nor is this merely a descriptive issue concerning the behaviour of typical pessimists. 
Those who accept NT will, of course, be under some pressure to explain why testimony – 
                                                          
14 See McGrath (2009) 
15 See, e.g., Tormey (1973: 39), and Wollheim (1980: 233). These claims are often qualified to some 
extent to allow for, e.g., experience of appropriate surrogates but such complications are irrelevant for 
my purposes. 
16 One exception to this is a norm which Hopkins (Ibid. 149) discusses, without endorsing, according 
to which ‘having the right to an aesthetic belief requires one to grasp the aesthetic grounds for it’ 
which, he argues, is compatible with the legitimacy of aesthetic judgements formed on the basis of 
principles of taste. Still, this is the exception rather than the rule and it would clearly be of no help to 
anyone seeking to form aesthetic judgements on the basis of TT. 
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which consistently proves so fruitful in other domains – is inadmissible as a source of 
aesthetic judgement. And the most plausible explanations which pessimists have offered 
typically appeal to some putative general feature of aesthetic judgements, such as their 
being ‘essentially perceptual’ (Pettit 1983: 24), or their needing to be ‘based upon a feeling of 
pleasure’ (Todd 2004: 278).17 It is, however, difficult to conceive of any such explanation 
which would plausibly rule out testimony as a legitimate source of aesthetic judgement 
while admitting the other expressions of critical approval discussed above.  
 
A related worry is that TT not only admits a number of sources other than testimony, but 
that, strictly speaking, it omits appeal to testimony altogether. The concern here is not that 
the test won’t involve appeal to the assertions of past critics, but that the assertions in 
question won’t count as genuine testimony (or, at least, not as testimony to those of us 
applying TT in the present day). A number of recent accounts of testimonial warrant have 
stressed the need to incorporate ‘the role seemingly played by a distinctive kind of 
interpersonal relationship between testifier and testifiee in our everyday practices of 
justifying testimonial-based beliefs’ (Wanderer 2013: 92). Advocates of such ‘interpersonal 
views’ are typically keen to stress the epistemic significance of certain social aspects of 
testimonial exchanges, such as trust between speaker and hearer (Faulkner 2011), or the fact 
that the testifier, in offering their assurance to their hearer that P is the case, thereby takes 
responsibility for the truth of P (Moran 2005). Without taking such factors into account, they 
argue, we are merely treating our interlocutors as truth-gauges of various degrees of 
reliability and are ignoring what makes testimony so epistemically interesting. We might 
worry, then, that someone sympathetic to this family of accounts would claim that TT 
doesn’t, appearances to the contrary, typically involve any appeal to testimony. After all, we 
rarely have any kind of interpersonal relationship with the contemporary critics whose 
views we encounter, let alone with those from past ages. 
                                                          
17 Kant’s (1790 / 2005: 94-7) own account of the nature of aesthetic judgement excludes not only 
testimony but any ‘empirical ground or proof’ as well as any ‘a priori proof’.  
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There are a number of things which could be said in response to this worry. I would 
not, for example, be particularly concerned to learn that there was a genuine tension 
between the claims I have made above and interpersonal views of testimony, since, to put 
things bluntly, I believe (for reasons offered in, e.g., Lackey (2008: 221-50)) that such views 
are mistaken. Arguing for this would, however, take me far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Fortunately, more concessive responses are available. One is to merely highlight that I am 
intending ‘testimony’ in this paper be used in a very broad sense so as to include ‘tellings in 
general (i.e with no restrictions either on subject matter, or on the speaker’s epistemic 
relation to it)’ (Fricker 1995: 396-7); a sense which will, as Sosa (1991: 219) points out, include 
‘posthumous publications’ which the speaker ‘might direct to the world at large and to no 
one in particular’. Nor is this usage merely stipulative. Rather, it is commonplace within the 
aesthetic testimony debate as it has been conducted thus far. Kant’s (1790 / 2005: 94-7) 
original defence of NT appealed to the impotence of ‘a hundred voices all praising’ a work 
in serving as grounds for an aesthetic judgement without feeling the need to specify 
anything about the relationship, if any, between speakers and hearer (and discussion of such 
factors is conspicuously absent from subsequent discussions). Further, a number of 
discussions of NT (such as Hopkins (2011: 154), Laetz (2008: 355), and Levinson (2005: 213)) 
directly discuss cases of testimony from past critics. As such, it remains clear that TT is in 
conflict with NT as it has been understood by both sides of the aesthetic testimony debate. 
Finally, it is important to stress that – while their focus typically remains on cases of direct 
assertion between individuals engaged in conversation – advocates of the interpersonal 
often maintain that their view of testimony can be extended to cover a range of other cases. 
For example, in his recent book defending a version of the interpersonal view, Paul Faulkner 
allows that we ‘can acquire testimonial knowledge […] from illicitly reading someone’s 
diary’ (2013: 197) as well as from historical records (Ibid. 1). As such, it is not clear that the 
appeal to the judgements of past critics in TT doesn’t involve testimony of a kind which 
would be amenable even to advocates of interpersonal views. 
 
It seems, then, that there is a clear conflict between NT and TT as I have understood them. 
However, some might worry that the putative conflict I am addressing does not reflect a 
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genuine tension between NT and TT themselves but that it is merely the result of some of 
the assumptions I have made in spelling out my preferred interpretations of these claims. In 
the next section I will argue that this objection is mistaken and that there is no way to 
successfully dissolve the conflict I have highlighted. 
 
3. Dissolving the Conflict? 
3.1 Appeals to Equivocation 
One strategy of this kind maintains that the tension  arises only because of an equivocation 
over the meaning of ‘judgement’. In one sense, of course, this objection is clearly mistaken 
since I have stipulated above that I intend ‘judgement’ to be understood in the same manner 
in both NT and TT. The real worry, though, is that those who have endorsed NT have 
typically meant something very different by ‘judgement’ than those who have accepted TT. 
If this were the case, then it would seem that the conflict is merely an artefact of my prior 
stipulations and that we have no reason to believe that the claims, as standardly understood, 
are in tension. Further, such an equivocation would hardly be surprising given the manifold 
different ways in which ‘judgement’ has been used within aesthetics (and even more so 
within philosophy more broadly). 
The most plausible version of this story appeals to an interpretation of NT according 
to which it should be taken as meaning that we cannot appreciate the aesthetic value of an 
object merely on the basis of testimony.18 Understood this way, NT certainly seems plausible; 
further, it removes any apparent conflict with TT construed as an epistemic claim. It is 
perfectly consistent to accept, on the basis of the testimony of generations of past critics, that 
the language in Shakespeare’s sonnets is beautiful while maintaining that we have not 
ourselves appreciated their beauty. Further, it does seem eminently plausible that some of 
the controversy over NT has been a merely verbal dispute between those who deny that 
testimony is a legitimate source of aesthetic appreciation and those who accept it is a 
                                                          
18 Interpretations of NT along these lines were suggested to me by audiences at a number of talks.  
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legitimate source of aesthetic belief.19 Yet it is clear that this strategy has its limitations. Even 
those, such as Aaron Meskin (2004: 76), who argue against pessimism, frequently concede 
that ‘there are things that testimony may never provide—aesthetic experiences and artistic 
appreciation’ and, more importantly for my purposes, a number of pessimists have been 
explicit that their claim is not merely one concerning appreciation. The quotes from 
Hopkins, Pettit, Todd and Whiting discussed above, for example, make it clear that all of 
these authors have adopted something like the understanding of NT which I have been 
proposing. As such, it is not plausible to maintain that the tension between NT and TT can 
be dissolved in the manner proposed.  
 
A second possible source of equivocation concerns the ‘aesthetic’ part of ‘aesthetic 
judgement’. I have thus far been treating both NT and TT as if they were general claims 
concerning a wide variety of evaluative judgements which we might make concerning 
artists and artworks. Yet, some may deny this. Those who discuss NT typically focus on 
judgements relating to aesthetic concepts in Frank Sibley’s (1959) sense; that is to concepts 
such as gracefulness, gaudiness garishness and so forth. Whereas many of those who discuss 
TT have focused on what Sibley (1965: 136) terms ‘verdicts’; that is, on ‘purely evaluative 
judgments’ as to ‘whether things are aesthetically good or bad, excellent or mediocre, 
superior to others or inferior, and so on’. Given this, we might, again, maintain that there is 
no genuine conflict between the two claims.20  
 As with the concerns relating to ‘judgement’ above, there is certainly something to 
this worry, and it may well be that certain restricted versions of our two key claims are not 
genuinely in conflict. However, this strategy clearly offers no defence against the claim that 
NT and TT are in tension when applied to judgements of the same kind. And I will argue, in §4 
and §5 below, that there is good reason to accept TT across a whole range of different 
                                                          
19 See Lopes (2014: 169-76). 
20 I thank David Davies for bringing this point to my attention.  
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judgements (including those relating to both aesthetic concepts and aesthetic verdicts in 
Sibley’s sense).  
 
3.2 Savile 
As a final strategy for dissolving the apparent conflict, consider, again, Johnson’s (1765) 
remark that when it comes to artworks ‘no other test can be applied than length of duration 
and continuance of esteem’. Johnson might be taken as appealing here to two importantly 
different standards: whether a work itself endures, and whether the work is held in 
continued esteem. Clearly, though, a work may endure in the sense of merely surviving, and 
even in the sense of being of continued interest to those in the artworld, without receiving 
continued esteem. Perhaps, then, what really matters for TT is not that a work is consistently 
judged to be a certain way by critics, but merely that the work itself endures in some 
relevant sense. Indeed, the most prominent and fully developed contemporary account of 
the test of time – presented by Savile (1977, 1982) – makes precisely this claim.21  
Savile (1977: 195) focuses on the test of time as a method for determining whether a 
work ‘is a truly great work of its genre’. He does not, of course, think we can establish this 
merely by appeal to a work’s duration in a straightforward sense since this is clearly neither 
necessary nor sufficient for that work passing the test of time (Ibid. 195-7). A mediocre work 
which survives unnoticed in the corner of an attic for centuries does not pass the test and a 
work can pass the test without itself surviving if, e.g., an accurate reproduction or 
photograph endures in its place. Instead, Savile appeals to the ability of a work to ‘survive in 
our attention’ (Ibid. 197), which, I take it, requires something like the work’s being the 
continued focus of interest, thought and discussion.  
Even with this clarification in place, though, Savile’s account is not yet complete 
since a work could survive in our attention for all the wrong reasons. First, a work may be of 
                                                          
21 It is worth noting that even if we find such an interpretation of TT plausible, it will still be 
dialectically limited. Since, while it may be compatible with accepting the letter of NT, it is clearly in 
tension with some of the wider principles used to motivate NT which I discussed in above. 
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interest for reasons which are completely irrelevant to its status as an artwork. It may, for 
example, attract attention for purely historical reasons, or because of its great monetary 
value. Second, a work may be of interest for aesthetic reasons but in a way which does 
nothing to establish its possession of significant aesthetic value. Savile (1982: 8-9) himself 
gives the example of someone interested in comparing Dante’s work to earlier Italian works 
written in the vernacular. Dante’s own works have clearly passed the test of time but for 
later critics to appreciate the extent to which these surpass earlier works of the same kind 
they must also pay continued attention to these lesser works. And this attention, focused as 
it will be on matters such as the style in which the different works are written, will clearly be 
aesthetic attention. In response to the first kind of worry, Savile (Ibid. 7) argues that the 
attention given to a work must be given ‘for reasons that bear on its critical estimation as the 
work it is’, and in response to the second that attention must be given to the work 
autonomously, considering the work for its own sake rather than as a means to better 
understand and appreciate some other work. This leaves us, then, with Savile’s final 
formulation of TT according to which a work passes the test of time  
if over a sufficiently long period it survives in our attention under an appropriate 
interpretation in a sufficiently embedded way. This condition will only be satisfied if the 
attention that the work is given is of a kind that generates experience relevant to its 
critical appreciation and attracts the attention that is given to it in its own right. (Ibid. 11-
2) 
Yet, even this final formulation is problematic. 
Savile maintains that his restriction to autonomous critical attention will successfully 
exclude cases where aesthetic attention is given to a work for the wrong reasons, but this is 
not so. Consider the opening lines from William McGonagall‘s ‘The Tay Bridge Disaster’. 
Beautiful Railway Bridge of the Silv’ry Tay! 
Alas! I am very sorry to say 
That ninety lives have been taken away 
On the last Sabbath day of 1879, 
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Which will be remember’d for a very long time. 
These lines, and McGonagall’s works more generally, have certainly survived in our 
attention – new editions of McGonagall’s works are still being published more than a 
century after his death – and the reason for their survival seems to be intimately tied up with 
concerns relevant to critical appreciation. Yet, the reason in this case does not relate to any 
great aesthetic achievement, nor to comparisons with any other work, but rather to their 
spectacular failure as poetic works. And surviving in this way is clearly not evidence for a 
work’s being excellent (indeed, it is evidence in the opposite direction). How, then, can we 
avoid the conclusion that McGonagall has even a defeasible claim to being numbered among 
the greats? 
 The only reliable method for avoiding claims of this kind is one which focuses not 
merely on the circumstances under which a work receives attention, or on the broad kind of 
attention which the works receives, but on the evaluative valence of that attention. Dante’s 
works can securely be judged as excellent because they have been regarded as excellent by 
generations of qualified critics, and McGonagall’s poems can be judged just as securely to be 
doggerel (albeit immensely entertainingly doggerel) for parallel reasons. Even Savile himself 
seems to concede this point at times. He suggests, for example, that a work which passes the 
test of time, and so is legitimately judged to be excellent, is one which not only receives 
continued attention but which is ‘widely appreciated over time by those […] whom we 
recognize as artistically sensitive and deeply concerned with correct judgement and 
perception in the arts’ (1977: 202). And once we have granted this it seems a small step to 
extend this to establishing the judgement that a work is execrable (or that it is dainty, drab, 
or dumpy) based on the collective testimony of those same individuals. It is for this reason, 
then, that I believe that the test should, strictly speaking, be concerned with whether 
particular judgements concerning a work endure (rather than with the survival of the work 
itself). It is a relatively straightforward matter to understand various claims about a work’s 
passing the test as merely a convenient shorthand for claims concerning judgements about 
that work. By contrast, there seems to be no plausible way of spelling out TT in a manner 
which is fundamentally concerned with the survival of the works themselves. 
16 
 
 
4. Aesthetic Common Knowledge 
4.1 Cases of Common Knowledge 
I have argued that there is a genuine tension between TT and NT. Merely highlighting this 
does not, however, tell us which (if either) we should accept. There are, of course, a number 
of arguments which have been put forward in defence of NT but offering anything like an 
adequate refutation of these would be far too extensive a task for a single paper.22 I will not, 
therefore, rehearse these arguments here (nor the various extant arguments against NT 
presented by, e.g., Meskin (2004), Laetz (2008) and Robson (2014). Instead, I will focus on 
presenting some considerations in favour of accepting TT – considerations which will, if the 
position I have outlined above is correct, also serve as reasons for rejecting NT. 
 
A first motivation for TT concerns what we might call ‘aesthetic common knowledge’. There 
are certain aesthetic claims – concerning the beauty of Shakespeare’s sonnets, the excellence 
of Caravaggio’s paintings,  and the superiority of Mozart’s music to Salieri’s – which are 
generally known amongst educated members of our society. In some cases this knowledge 
will arise (at least in part) from relevant first-hand experience of the objects in question. I 
will argue, however, that it need not do so, and that in many cases such knowledge arises 
merely from learning that the relevant judgements have passed the test of time. In order to 
demonstrate this, though, I will need to first make some general remarks concerning the 
debate surrounding aesthetic testimony which often focusses on ‘toy’ cases such as the 
following: 
Exhibition: I have recently been to see an exhibition of works by a new artist with whom 
we are both previously unfamiliar. I later inform you that the works in the exhibition are 
uniformly excellent.23 
                                                          
22 Though see Robson (2015). 
23 See e.g., Hopkins (2011: 138), Whiting (forthcoming: 1) and Robson (2015: 756). 
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Asking whether, on the basis of my say so alone, you can come to know that the works in 
question are excellent. Those who accept NT will claim that you cannot, and that the details 
of the case are irrelevant to determining this. By contrast, those of us who reject NT will 
maintain that the details matter a great deal. It is possible in principle for you to acquire 
knowledge that the works are excellent in this manner but whether you do so in this 
particular case will depend on a number of factors: my capabilities as an aesthetic judge, my 
track record for honesty, and so forth.24 Yet, whatever we end up saying about such cases, it 
doesn’t strike me that the answer to the knowledge question is obvious. I think that the 
pessimist is wrong that you cannot, as a matter of principle, achieve knowledge in such 
cases, but I can certainly feel the force of the pessimistic intuition concerning them.25 
Focusing on cases of this kind, though, can tend to stack the deck in favour of the pessimist, 
as we can see by discussing some rather different examples. 
Consider, by contrast, the case of someone who has never encountered Shakespeare’s 
plays or Beethoven’s music for themselves. Would it really be plausible to suppose that such 
an individual doesn’t know anything about the aesthetic qualities of these works? Unlike the 
first case there seems to be only one plausible answer to this question: such an individual 
would – presuming they are aware of the enduring reputation of these works – be in 
possession of at least some knowledge regarding the aesthetic character of these works. 
Indeed Jerrold Levinson (2005: 213) goes so far as to classify the judgement that ‘the Adagio 
of Beethoven's Third Symphony’ possesses certain aesthetic properties ‘on the basis of 
centuries of testimony’ as a paradigmatic example of a legitimate second-hand judgement.26  
 
                                                          
24 It is controversial precisely what is required for testimonial knowledge in even the most mundane 
circumstances. See, e.g., Burge (1993), Faulkner (2011), Fricker (1994), and Lackey (2008). 
25 See Robson (2015). 
26 The particular properties which Levinson highlights are not straightforwardly evaluative ones but 
Levinson’s arguments are clearly intended to also apply with respect to judgements concerning 
evaluative aesthetic properties. 
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I take it that anti-pessimistic intuitions concerning such cases are powerful and widely 
shared, but there will, doubtless, be some who remain unconvinced. Even setting aside 
general worries concerning the evidential value of intuitions, there will be those who either 
do not share these intuitions or who remain confident that the pessimist can explain them 
away. Further, even those who do take these intuitions to provide evidence in favour of TT 
may still judge that this is outweighed by the stronger intuitive evidence which cases such 
as Exhibition provide in favour of NT. In order to avoid such am impasse, then, I will move 
(in §5 below) beyond mere appeal to intuition and offer some more theoretically robust 
reasons for accepting TT. Before doing so, though, I will consider some more substantive 
responses which a defender of NT may offer to my appeal to aesthetic common knowledge. 
 
4.2 Rejecting the Appeal to Common Knowledge 
First, it might be suggested that the success of the appeal I have presented here is dependent 
on my earlier decision to spell out NT in narrowly epistemic / cognitivist terms. This 
dependence is, however, merely superficial. Those pessimists who appeal to non-epistemic 
norms can, of course, freely concede that the judgements I have discussed above count as 
knowledge without compromising their position. Such a move will, however, give them no 
dialectical advantage here since they will still be committed (qua pessimists) to denying that 
the judgements in question are legitimate. Similar claims also apply with respect to the 
expressivist defender of NT. Those expressivists who wish to maintain, following e.g. 
Blackburn (1980), that aesthetic judgements can literally attain the status of knowledge will, 
of course, encounter precisely the objection I have outlined above. Even those who don’t 
make such a claim, though, will still need to accept that certain aesthetic judgements are 
legitimate in a way in which others are not.27 If they place the judgements I have discussed 
                                                          
27 I take this to be the case for reasons highlighted in, e.g., Fricker (2006: 236–7). I will not argue for 
this claim here, though, since those expressivists who reject it will have thereby committed 
themselves to rejecting a key aspect of my opponent’s view (the contrast in legitimacy between first-
hand aesthetic judgements and those formed on the basis of testimony).  
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above in the former category, then this will mean abandoning NT; if they place them in the 
latter,  this will be highly counterintuitive for reasons paralleling those outlined above. 
 
A second concern is whether such putative cases of aesthetic common knowledge provide 
any reason for rejecting NT not already provided by more prosaic cases. Some might worry 
that whatever reasons we have for judging that the test of time can serve as a legitimate 
source of aesthetic judgment will be derivative of our reasons for believing that the 
testimony of particular critics can do so. As such, the resolution of these debates will 
ultimately depend on the much more familiar debate concerning whether we can 
legitimately form aesthetic judgements on the basis of testimony from individual critics.28 
After all, the hypothetical objector claims, if we deny that the testimony of any individual 
critic carries any weight when it comes to the formation of aesthetic judgement, then it is 
difficult to see how the combined judgements of many such critics could do so. On the other 
hand, if we do accept that the judgements of individual critics carry such weight then we 
have already rejected NT and any appeal to TT will be redundant. Either way, an appeal to 
the test of time does nothing to advance the debate concerning NT. 
 There is some truth to both horns of this dilemma, but each of them, ultimately, 
misrepresents the current state of the dialectic. Taking the second horn first, I am more than 
happy to admit that the case of individual critics should be enough to settle matters in favour 
of the pessimist’s opponent (the optimist concerning aesthetic testimony). Still, as a matter of 
descriptive fact, this view is not widely shared and many people’s intuitions concerning 
cases of testimony from individual critics appear to favour pessimism. By contrast, appeals 
to the test of time tend (as with appeals to testimony concerning natural beauty or ‘lost 
works’) to elicit optimistic intuitions.29 Yet, I do not take the difference here to be merely a 
descriptive one and while testimony from individual critics does provides good reason for 
accepting optimism, appealing to TT provides us with an even stronger case. 
                                                          
28 I thank an anonymous referee from the journal for pushing me to consider this worry. 
29 See, e.g., Robson (2012: 5) and Laetz (2008: 255). 
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 Consider first that, contrary to what the first horn of the dilemma presupposes, those 
who accept NT need not deny that the testimony of individual critics carries some weight. 
Pessimists regularly concede that the testimony of individual critics can motivate seeking to 
experience a work for myself (Gorodeisky 2010: 59-60), give me grounds for reconsidering 
my own view (Hopkins 2001: 168-9), and provide some limited degree of warrant for 
forming the relevant belief (Hopkins 2000: 219). The crucial aspect of their claim is merely 
that such testimony cannot, by itself, provide me with legitimate grounds for forming an 
aesthetic judgement. Yet, even if someone were to judge, falsely in my view, that the 
testimony of each individual critic (considered in isolation) carried no weight this wouldn’t 
entail that the combined testimony of centuries of such critics was similarly impotent. There 
may, for example, be some potential defeater which would undermine any particular critic’s 
testimony, but which would be unable to similarly undermine a cross-temporal critical 
consensus. Of course, merely presenting this possibility in such an abstract fashion is little 
more than a promissory note which is unlikely to placate anyone. I will, however, argue (in 
§5.2 below) that there are a number of potential defeaters for the testimony of any individual 
critic which do not apply to judgements based on TT.  
 
5. Aesthetic Unreliability 
5.1 Two Sources of Unreliability 
My second reason for maintaining that TT plays a pivotal role within aesthetic epistemology 
concerns the fragile and problematic nature of many of our first-hand aesthetic judgements. 
In particular, I will focus on two kinds of worry concerning the reliability of our aesthetic 
judgements. The first of these involves some now standard considerations highlighted in 
Hume’s own discussion of TT; prejudice, passing fashion and the like. The second concerns 
recent empirical evidence which shows that our first-hand judgements are also unreliable in 
some more surprising ways. I will argue that second-hand aesthetic judgements which have 
passed the test of time will tend to be less susceptible to both kinds of distorting factor than 
first-hand aesthetic judgements.  
21 
 
 
The idea that aesthetic judgements are uniquely, or at least unusually, susceptible to certain 
kinds of distorting factor is hardly a new one. Hume (1757 / 1875: 255) mentions the 
propensity of ‘[a]uthority or prejudice’ to give ‘a temporary vogue to a bad poet or orator’ 
and opines the rareness of the true judge who is ‘free from all prejudice’ allowing ‘nothing 
to enter into his consideration but the very object which is submitted to his examination’ 
(Ibid 263). Nor are these worries unique to Hume. Indeed, the claim that our aesthetic 
judgements can be problematically susceptible to such factors is hardly controversial  
To see how the test of time can help to correct such distorting factors consider Sibley’s 
(1968: 50-51) claim that the  
possibility of error with a case that has elicited long-lasting convergence decreases as 
possible explanations of error become more obviously absurd; e.g. we could not sensibly 
reject a centuries-spanning consensus about Oedipus as being the result of personal bias, 
enthusiasm for a novel style, or passing fashions or fads. I do not mean that, in other 
cases, there is always some reason for doubt; only that the long-attested cases may 
virtually exclude the theoretical sceptic's doubt as absurd. 
Why is it that the sceptic’s doubts in such a case border on absurdity? Personal biases come 
in various kinds and it is, perhaps, overly optimistic to think that these are entirely 
eliminated when it comes to Oedipus. What is clear, though, is that many of the most 
straightforward kinds of bias, which may have influenced spectators in ancient Athens, have 
no application to those of us in later centuries. None of us regard Sophocles as either a friend 
or enemy, nor do we have any personal stake in his success or failure. Similarly, any enticing 
novelty which his plays once enjoyed has long since subsided and passing fads are, well, 
passing (and a critical consensus which has endured for over two millennia hardly 
qualifies).30  
This is not, of course, to suggest that all first-hand judgements are unreliable. I am 
perfectly happy to concede (as Sibley) that there are cases where we are able to eliminate 
                                                          
30 A similar argument can be found in Hume’s own (1757 / 1875: 238) discussion of the test of time. 
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such possibilities even when the judgements in question have not passed the test of time. 
What I do want to maintain, though, is that while these doubts are standardly eliminated 
with respect to judgements which pass this test they are much more pervasive with respect 
to first-hand aesthetic judgement. Nor is this kind of defence of TT limited to the sources of 
error which Sibley lists. 
 
5.2 Empirical Evidence of Unreliability 
Recent empirical work in aesthetics appears to show that our aesthetic judgements are often 
unduly influenced by irrelevant factors such as ordering effects, belief polarization, and 
confabulation. Consider, for example, the following studies which are representative of a 
much wider body of research.31 A study by McLaughlin et al. (1983) found that ‘[a]esthetic 
preferences for asymmetric pictures’ were partially ‘determined by the direction of cerebral 
asymmetry’. That is, that those who were right-handed tended to find ‘paintings whose 
areas of visual interest are primarily in the right portion of the painting were “more 
aesthetically pleasing” while left-handed subjects preferred visual interest to the left’ (Irvin 
2014: 39). Another (by Ginsburgh & Ours (2003)) revealed that ‘a critical determinant of 
success’ in musical contests ‘is the order in which musicians perform’ (289) even in cases 
where this order is randomly assigned. Finally, a pair of studies carried out by Ayumi 
Yamada (2009) demonstrated that subjects’ preferences between representational and 
abstract paintings varied depending on which aspects of their evaluations they were asked 
to verbalise. Yamada found that ‘when participants attempt to describe their reasons for 
liking each painting […] they will be more likely to prefer the representational painting over 
the abstract one’ but ‘when asked to describe their reasons for disliking’ each they would be 
‘more likely to dislike the representational painting’ (1141). 
Again, we can see how appealing to TT can help here. While our first-hand aesthetic 
judgements are often unduly influenced by such irrelevant situational factors it seems 
highly implausible to think that a centuries-spanning consensus about a work will be. 
                                                          
31 See, e.g., Irvin (2014), Kieran (2011) and Lopes (2014). 
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Different critics in different eras will encounter works in an incredibly diverse range of 
circumstances and, as such, the longer a critical consensus lasts the less likely it becomes that 
such irrelevant aspects of the particular situation in which a work is viewed play any 
significant role in its formation. As such, we once again have good reason to hold that 
aesthetic judgements which pass the test of time will typically be more secure than standard 
instances of first-hand aesthetic judgement.  
 Not only that but we can also see how, mutatis mutandis, they will typically be more 
secure than second-hand judgements formed on the basis of testimony from individual 
critics. Despite their expertise many critics will still be influenced by prejudice, passing 
fashion and the like. Similarly, there is good reason to believe that even expert critics will 
still be susceptible to the kinds of situational factors which recent empirical work has 
highlighted.32 For this reason, then, we can see why the first horn of the dilemma I consider 
in §4.2 is misguided. With respect to particular individual critics there will often be a broad 
range of potential defeaters for accepting their testimony concerning the aesthetic properties 
of some work: perhaps they are influenced by some passing fad, or subject to ordering 
effects, or… Yet, such defeaters do not typically arise with respect to the cross-temporal 
consensus of such critics represented by TT. Given this, it would be perfectly consistent for 
someone to maintain that the testimony of individual critics carries no (or negligible) 
epistemic weight but that a centuries-spanning critical consensus is enough to provide us 
with aesthetic knowledge. Of course, I don’t personally take our epistemic position with 
respect to the testimony of individual critics to be anything like this bleak. Potential 
defeaters need not, after all, be actual defeaters. Further, even when such defeaters are 
present we will sometimes have good reason to judge that they are themselves defeated in 
particular cases.  
 
                                                          
32 Indeed the research by Ginsburgh & Ours (2003) discussed above focused on theinfluence of 
ordering effects on the expert judges for the prestigious Queen Elisabeth music competition. There is, 
however, (as, e.g., Irvin 2014 discusses) some reason to believe that certain distorting factors will, 
while still present, be less pronounced with respect to experts. 
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I have argued, then, that we have good reason to hold that aesthetic judgements formed on 
the basis of a cross-temporal consensus of critical testimony are typically more secure than 
either first-hand judgements or those formed on the basis of testimony from a single critic. 
This claim would, however, only hold if we assume that the critics involved possess a 
sufficient degree of independence from each other;33 something which would not be so if, for 
example, later critics treated earlier critics as what Goldman (2001: 101) terms ‘gurus’ such 
that ‘[w]hatever the guru believes is slavishly believed by his followers. They fix their 
opinions wholly and exclusively on the basis of their leader's views.’ If this were the case, 
and later critics merely unreflectively aped the judgements of earlier critics, then their 
agreement would provide no additional warrant for accepting these judgements. 
Fortunately, though, such an extreme positon is implausible, and the tendency of critics – 
both synchronically and diachronically – to disagree with each other is well documented.34 
 It would, however, be similarly implausible to maintain that critics are never 
influenced by the judgements of their predecessors, since there is – as I discuss elsewhere 
(Robson 2014: 2523-2524) – clear empirical evidence which shows that they frequently are. 
Yet, this concession does not undermine TT for two reasons. First, given the truth of 
optimism, some degree of deference to the aesthetic judgements of others (particularly 
expert critics) is precisely what we would expect from an epistemically responsible agent. 
Second, and more fundamentally, the degree of deference which does exist is clearly 
compatible with a significant degree of independence between critics. In particular, it is 
important to stress just how rare it is for a work to achieve anything like the kind of cross-
temporal critical consensus required by TT. Many works praised to the heavens by 
contemporary critics meet with corresponding levels of opprobrium in later generations. 
Others eventually receive critical acclaim after long periods of neglect or disdain. Indeed, it 
is precisely this inability to predict which works from our own era will go on to receive 
                                                          
33 I thank Wlodek Rabinowicz for pushing me to address this point.  
34 See, e.g., Ross (forthcoming). 
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continued esteem which is often used to motivate appeals to the test of time.35 Given this, it 
seems safe to suggest that the judgements of later critics are not systematically influenced in 
problematic ways by those of critics in earlier generations. This does not, however, show 
that their judgements aren’t problematically influenced in other ways. For example, it has 
recently been claimed that, for a variety of reasons, works are included in, or excluded from, 
the artistic canon on the basis of features which have no relevance to their aesthetic 
standing. 
 
5.3 A Worry Concerning Canon Formation 
Worries of the second kind are relatively easily dealt with. It is doubtless the case, for 
example, that (as discussed in, e.g., Eaton (2008: 878-9)) a number of works have been 
excluded from the canon – and that various positive judgements concerning them have 
failed to pass TT – owing in large part to aesthetically irrelevant factors such as the gender, 
race or class of the artist. However, this raises no problems for my defence of TT since I do 
not take the failure of a work to pass the test to be in any way indicative of that work’s 
lacking aesthetic value. Of course, the overarching concern here is not merely with works 
being excluded from the canon, since parallel worries arise with respect to those works 
which are admitted. Again, though, such worries aren’t particularly bad news for the 
defender of TT. We can grant both that artists from certain privileged social groups – or 
artworks which, as Smith (1988: 51) puts it, ‘reflect and reinforce establishment ideologies’ – 
are more likely to achieve canonical status and that those works that do attain it are very 
likely to possess significant aesthetic merit. After all, the vast majority of artworks produced 
by those in positions of great privilege who seek to reinforce establishment ideologies still 
fail to attain canonicity. This is not, of course, to deny that there is anything wrong with 
current methods of canon formation. The exclusion of various social groups from the artistic 
canon is clearly an issue which should be of great concern (from both a moral and aesthetic 
                                                          
35 Ironically, Hume’s own (1757 / 1875: 235) example of the obvious superiority of Addison’s work to 
Bunyan’s provides an apt example here since the majority of modern critics are of the opposite 
opinion. 
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point of view). It is not, however, one which  undermines the particular epistemic claim (TT) 
which I am arguing for in this paper.  
 
A more worrisome objection arises from James Cutting’s (2003) celebrated experiments 
which demonstrated that his students’ preference for particular impressionist paintings 
increased the more they were exposed (often without conscious awareness) to those 
paintings. That is that mere repeated exposure to a painting was enough to increase their 
positive evaluation of it. This so called ‘mere exposure effect’ has subsequently been 
replicated across a range of art forms and with respect to a number of different measures, 
leading many psychologists to endorse Cutting’s (2003: 335) claim that  
artistic canons are promoted and maintained, in part, by a diffuse but continual 
broadcast of their images to the public by museums, authors, and publishers 
[…making…] mere exposure a prime vehicle for canon maintenance. Tacitly and 
incrementally over time, this broadcast teaches the public to like the images, to prefer 
them, eventually to recognize them as part of the canon, and to want to see them again. 
In turn, it seems likely that this implicit education also reinforces the choices made by 
professionals in what they present to that public.  
If this is correct, though, and mere exposure plays such a significant role in determining 
which works are admitted into the canon, doesn’t this undermine TT? If a particular work is 
only, or primarily, approved of by centuries of critics owing to their repeated exposure to 
the work then this is surely no grounds for judging that the work is genuinely excellent.  
To begin on a concessive note, it is important to stress that I am in no way claiming 
that the test of time is infallible. As such, even if there are some cases where a judgement 
concerning a work passes the test for reasons irrelevant to its aesthetic value this will not 
necessarily undermine my defence of TT. Of course, such a response will only succeed if 
these cases are sufficiently rare, which leads us to the less concessive parts of my response.  
First, note that our tendency to be exposed to particular artworks is not neutral with 
respect to the value of such works. Consider, for example, that the decision of a gallery or 
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museum to display a work (and likewise to sell prints and postcards of that work, to use 
images of the work in their publicity material, and so forth) typically – though not 
universally, Massachusetts’ Museum of Bad Art being one notable exception – involves a 
tacit endorsement of the quality of that work. As such, moving (albeit unconsciously) from 
increased exposure to a work to the judgement that the work in question actually possesses 
greater aesthetic value may be a useful – though far from infallible – heuristic. Further, there 
is reason to think that the mere exposure effect is rather more discriminating than has 
typically been claimed. An intriguing recent study by Meskin et al (2013) appears to show 
that while mere exposure increased liking with respect to high quality works (such as the 
impressionist paintings Cutting used in his studies) it actually decreased liking with respect 
to works of poorer quality (such those of Thomas Kinkade). Leading them to conclude that 
with respect to canon formation 
mere exposure cannot be the full story; frequent and repeated presentation (or 
representation) of artworks does not look as if it will ensure that they are in the canon, 
since mere exposure to bad paintings such as Kinkade’s decreases liking for them. 
For these reasons, then, it looks as if we should not be unduly concerned about the influence 
of mere exposure in canon formation. 
For those unconvinced by what I have said above, the final aspect of my response to 
the canon formation worry takes the form of a tu quoque. If we assume, as I think we should 
not, that mere exposure plays an illegitimate and highly pervasive role in canon formation 
then this will certainly generate some serious sceptical worries for defenders of TT. Such 
worries are not, however, unique to aesthetic judgements formed by applying the test of 
time (or on the basis of testimony more broadly). Rather they are, as Cutting’s experiments 
show, equally applicable with respect to our first-hand aesthetic judgements. Given this they 
cannot be used by the defender of NT to show that the test of time is a less effective source of 
aesthetic judgment than first-hand acquaintance with the relevant works. With respect to 
mere exposure, the two sources would be on a par whereas, as I have demonstrated above, 
there are a number of other respects in which the test of time clearly serves as a superior 
source of aesthetic judgement. 
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I have shown, then, not only that there is a genuine tension between NT and TT but, also, 
that we have good reason to accept the latter and, therefore, reason to reject the former. 
Given this, it becomes increasingly important to consider how precisely we should 
formulate the test of time and how best to apply it. This is, however, a task for another 
time.36 
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